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Abstract
The aggregation of individual judgments on logically interconnected propo-
sitions into a collective decision on the same propositions is called judgment
aggregation. Literature in social choice and political theory has claimed that
judgment aggregation raises serious concerns. For example, consider a set of
premises and a conclusion where the latter is logically equivalent to the former.
When majority voting is applied to some propositions (the premises) it may
give a different outcome than majority voting applied to another set of propo-
sitions (the conclusion). This problem is known as the discursive dilemma (or
paradox). The discursive dilemma is a serious problem since it is not clear
whether a collective outcome exists in these cases, and if it does, what it is like.
Moreover, the two suggested escape-routes from the paradox — the so-called
premise-based procedure and the conclusion-based procedure — are not, as I
will show, satisfactory methods for group decision-making. In this paper I intro-
duce a new aggregation procedure inspired by an operator defined in artificial
intelligence in order to merge belief bases. The result is that we do not need
to worry about paradoxical outcomes, since these arise only when inconsistent
collective judgments are not ruled out from the set of possible solutions.
∗The title of this paper in an earlier version was “Collective decision-making without paradoxes:
a fusion approach”. This research was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council
(ESRC), the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the German Federal Ministry of Education and
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1
1 Introduction
A department of a prestigious university offers one career development fellowship to
a candidate (proposition R) if and only if the candidate proposed a good research
project (P ) and if she has an excellent track record of publication (Q). The complex
decision rule can be expressed as (P ∧Q)↔ R. Suppose that there are three members
in the departmental committee. Each of them consistently casts her vote on R (the
conclusion) depending on her judgments on P and Q (the premises). The three
members vote as shown in the table below.
P=Good project? Q=Excellent publication? R=Fellowship?
Member 1 Yes Yes Yes
Member 2 Yes No No
Member 3 No Yes No
Majority Yes Yes No
A majority voting on the propositions (propositionwise majority voting) produces
an inconsistent result, as a majority accepts P , a majority accepts Q (therefore, a
majority accepts P ∧ Q), but a majority rejects R. Although each member of the
committee made a judgment on the propositions P , Q and R consistently with the
decision rule (P ∧ Q) ↔ R, the collective outcome violates the same decision rule.
The above is an example of the so-called discursive dilemma (Kornhauser and Sager
1986; Kornhauser and Sager 1993; Chapman 1998; Brennan 2001; Pettit 2001; List
2006a).1
In order to escape the paradox and obtain a final decision, two procedures have
been suggested (Pettit 2001; Chapman 2002; Bovens and Rabinowicz 2006; List
2006b). One procedure is to let each member publicly vote on each premise and
1The fellowship example given here is logically equivalent to the one originally used in Kornhauser
and Sager 1986 to illustrate the discursive dilemma.
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to assign the fellowship to a candidate only if a majority of the committee members
believes that the candidate submitted a good research project and that she has an
excellent publication record track (this is called the premise-based procedure). The
second procedure is that each member decides about P and Q and then publicly says
yes to the conclusion R only if she believes that both P and Q are true (this is called
the conclusion-based procedure). If the latter procedure is followed, the candidate will
obtain the fellowship if and only if a majority in the committee voted for R.
The moral of the story is that a consistent collective outcome can only be defined
if either the premise-based procedure or the conclusion-based procedure is adopted.
But the two procedures may lead to contradictory results (one saying yes and the
other saying no to a certain candidate), depending on whether the majority is taken
on the individual judgments of P and Q, or whether the majority is calculated on
the individual votes of R. This is obviously a serious problem, not only because it is
unclear which of these two (to let the individuals vote on P and Q, or to let them
vote on R) is the correct method, but also because it makes the collective outcome
open to manipulation through the stipulation of a specific procedure.
Furthermore, the discursive paradox illustrates that collective inconsistencies can
be obtained when consistent sets of propositions are aggregated. The idea is that
individuals vote (in the form of yes/no) on logically connected propositions, and that
different (and equally sensible) judgment aggregation procedures give contradictory
collective outcomes, though each individual behaves rationally. As in the fellowship
example, each member says yes to R only if she says yes both to P and to Q (like
member 1). Voting against P (member 3) or against Q (member 2) forces the voter to
reject R. All three members conform their judgment to the logical constraints between
the premises (P and Q) and the conclusion R expressed by the rule (P ∧ Q) ↔ R.
Since the conjunction of the premises is equivalent to the conclusion, one would expect
that an aggregation procedure applied on the individual judgments on the premises
would give the same result as the aggregation on the individual conclusions. But
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this is not the case, and it is precisely where the paradox arises. Moreover, List and
Pettit (2002; 2004) have shown that the contradiction does not depend on the specific
choice of aggregation procedure. Rather, they prove a general impossibility theorem
such that there exists no aggregation function that satisfies a minimal set of desirable
conditions.2 More impossibility results followed that of List and Pettit (Dokow and
Holzman 2005; Ga¨rdenfors 2005; Nehring and Puppe 2005; Pauly and van Hees 2006;
Dietrich 2006).
In this paper I will argue that we need not to worry about the discursive dilemma,
provided that we fully recognize the logical relations between premises and conclusion,
and that we understand the logic of aggregating sets of judgments. The framework
I use to define and analyze the aggregation of individual judgments profits from
the collaboration of two (so far separate) research areas: belief merging and col-
lective decision. The aggregation procedures used in belief merging and in group
decision-making are similar. Belief merging defines a class of operators that produce
collective belief from individual (and possibly conflicting) belief bases, and group
decision-making studies operators that produce a collective decision from individual
preferences. Some of the merging operators proposed in the literature were inspired
by some of the voting procedures studied in social choice theory. I believe that also
methods from belief merging can be fruitfully imported into group decision-making
where, like in judgment aggregation, the individual’s decision does not inevitably
come as a preference ordering, but has a propositional form.
The main goal of this paper is to reveal that the discursive paradox disappears
as soon as we recognize that aggregating logically consistent individual judgments
does not guarantee a consistent collective outcome. Additional constraints need to
be imposed in order to rule out infeasible group judgments. Moreover, the collective
outcome does not always coincide with a unique assignment of yes/no to each propo-
sition under consideration. It may indeed happen that a disjunction of consistent
2We will go back to these conditions in section 5, to show that the new aggregation procedure
proposed here relaxes one of the conditions of List and Pettit.
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judgments is chosen as the collective outcome. Hence, to make complex collective de-
cisions without running into a paradox we may have to allow to be indecisive among
multiple judgments. An outcome in the new aggregation procedure is a set of ar-
guments. An argument is a consistent truth-value assignment to a conclusion and
to the premises supporting that conclusion. The premise-based procedure and the
conclusion-based procedure are therefore included in a unitary approach, which I will
call argument-based procedure.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 it will be argued that the
premise-based procedure and the conclusion-based procedure cannot be rationally
justified and therefore do not solve the discursive dilemma. In section 3 the general
framework of the new model will be introduced, while the formal framework will be
discussed in section 4. In section 5 it will be shown that the discursive dilemma can be
avoided when the argument-based procedure is used. This procedure focuses on the
argument structure that connects (and logically constraints) the premises with the
conclusion. Compared to the premise-based and the conclusion-based procedures,
the new approach displays some additional interesting properties which allow, for
example, the relaxation of various typically made conditions in judgment aggregation,
like the completeness of the sets of judgments, leading to a more realistic account of
group decision-making.
2 Neither Premise nor Conclusion-Based Proce-
dure
As I sketched in the previous section, the premise-based and conclusion-based pro-
cedures have been adopted as escape-routes from the discursive dilemma. In this
section I will criticize these two approaches and claim that we need an aggregation
method that provides a conclusion together with proper reasons to support it.
The premise-based and the conclusion-based procedures were both discussed by
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Pettit (Pettit 2001) within the context of deliberative democracy (for an introduc-
tion see Elster 1998).3 The ideal of deliberative democracy requires that the whole
community be involved in the decision-making process: people have the right to ask
for the reasons that supported a decision and to question them. In this respect, the
premise-based procedure seems to be more appropriate. Yet there is a serious worry
about this method, concerning whether it can guarantee the citizen control of the
decision.
As Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006) first noticed, the problem is that it is not
clear how one identifies the premises in a complex compound. Suppose that 7 voters
express their judgments on the propositions A, B and C according to the decision
rule ((A∧B)∨ (¬A∧¬B))↔ C. Their judgments are shown in the following table:
A B C A ∧B ¬A ∧ ¬B
Voter 1 1 1 1 1 0
Voter 2 1 1 1 1 0
Voter 3 1 1 1 1 0
Voter 4 1 0 0 0 0
Voter 5 1 0 0 0 0
Voter 6 0 1 0 0 0
Voter 7 0 1 0 0 0
Majority 1 1 0 0 0
Clearly this is a case of discursive paradox, since a majority says yes to the propo-
sitions A and B, yet a majority rejects the conclusion C. But, in addition, majority
voting gives two divergent results depending on what we take to be the premises. If
the premise-based procedure is applied to the atomic propositions A, B, then the
conclusion C should be accepted. If the majority voting is applied to the disjuncts
3For a discussion of these two procedures from an epistemic perspective, see Bovens and Rabi-
nowicz 2006 and List 2005.
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A ∧ B and ¬A ∧ ¬B, then the conclusion C is rejected.4 Needless to say, in the
framework of judgment aggregation it is problematic to rationally justify whether we
should take a premise to be an atomic proposition or not, and this renders the whole
premise-based procedure open to manipulation.
Let us now turn to the conclusion-based procedure. Kornhauser and Sager (Korn-
hauser 1992; Kornhauser and Sager 1986, 1993) were the first to discover the discursive
dilemma and in their juridical example a three-member court has to decide whether
a defendant is liable under a charge of breach of a contract. According to the legal
doctrine, the defendant is liable (R) if and only if the contract was valid (P ) and
there was a breach (Q). This case is logically equivalent to our committee example,
and thus a possible discursive paradox.
A verdict in a court is a public act. Not only, if convicted, has a defendant the
right to know the reasons for which she has been convicted, but also these reasons will
guide future decisions — they are patterns for future verdicts. In other words, the
final decision must be supported and justified by reasons. For cases similar to this,
a method like the conclusion-based procedure that defines the collective outcome
without providing support for it, is not satisfactory. We need an approach that
provides a collective decision and the reasons supporting that decision.
In section 5, I will show that the paradox disappears as soon as exclusively con-
sistent sets of judgments are accepted as candidates for group decision outcomes and,
at the same time, we dispose of an aggregation procedure that does not require that
a unique assignment of yes/no to the propositions under consideration is selected
as the collective outcome. The new method will select the most popular argument
(and eventually more than one). By argument I mean a consistent judgment on a
conclusion together with the reasons supporting that conclusion. The premise-based
procedure and the conclusion-based procedure will be reconciled in a unique approach
with no fear of paradoxical results.
4Bovens and Rabinowicz referred to this problem as the instability of the premise-based procedure.
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3 The Framework
The aggregation procedure that will be used in this paper is inspired by a merging
operator defined in artificial intelligence. A merging operator combines5 various and
possibly conflicting belief bases. A belief base Ki is a finite set of propositional
formulas representing the explicit beliefs of the individual i. The merged base is a
set which consistently integrates parts of the knowledge from all the initial bases,
and satisfies some additional conditions, such as integrity constraints.6 The items of
the resulting collective knowledge base are identified by rules like the majority rule.
It should therefore be clear that belief merging and general aggregation problems
share a similar objective, i.e. the definition of operators that produce collective belief
from individual belief bases, and operators that produce a collective decision from
individual judgments (or preferences).7 Some researchers have found inspiration for
belief merging operators by examining voting procedures from social choice theory
(Konieczny 1999; Lin and Mendelzon 1999). Here I want to show how methods from
belief fusion can be fruitfully imported into judgment aggregation to tackle specific
problems.
First, some terminology is in order. Following the literature on belief merging,
the words ‘knowledge’ and ‘belief’ will be used interchangeably in this paper.8 This
5Konieczny (2000) refers the term ‘combination’ to the syntax-based fusion operators. We will
instead use the verbs ‘to combine’, ‘to merge’ and ‘to fuse’ as synonyms.
6An integrity constraint (Kowalski 1978; Reiter 1988) is a sentence that has to be satisfied by the
merged base. It is usually not required that the individual bases satisfy the integrity constraints,
though I will assume it. By doing so, I will maintain the model as close as possible to the original
formulation of the discursive paradox, where each voter consistently casts her vote on a set of
propositions. We will see that integrity constraints play a crucial role in avoiding irrational sets of
collective judgments.
7Social choice theory studies how individual preferences are combined in order to select a collec-
tively preferred alternative. Relationships between judgment aggregation and preference aggregation
have been investigated (List and Pettit 2004; Dietrich and List 2006). Also the links between belief
merging and social choice theory have been explored (Konieczny and Pino-Pe´rez 2005; Eckert and
Pigozzi 2005; Pigozzi 2005).
8Also in the belief revision literature (a separate but related area to belief fusion, see Konieczny
1999) the use of the word ‘knowledge’ in a broader sense than in the epistemological literature —
such that ‘knowledge’ also covers what is traditionally meant by ‘belief’ — is commonly accepted
(Ga¨rdenfors 1988).
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is because a fusion operator can be interpreted as an operator merging knowledge or
belief bases. Furthermore, the elements of a knowledge base are not required to be
true. This would simply be too big an idealization for practical applications in which
knowledge is taken to be defeasible — for example when an expert system is defined
by merging the knowledge of a group of human experts.
When merging individual belief bases, two cases can occur. If all individual bases
are mutually consistent, then the collective outcome can easily be constructed: it is
the union of all the individual bases. More interesting, however, is the case when the
individual belief bases are in conflict with each other. There are two main approaches
to this problem depending on whether all the individuals are treated equally or not.9
For the purpose of the paper, fusion operators for individuals who have the same
power to influence the final decision will be considered. I will, in fact, restrict myself
to the classical discursive dilemma where all voters have equal power.10
Some merging operators for knowledge bases of equally reliable sources have been
proposed by Borgida and Imielinski (1984), Konieczny and Pino-Pe´rez (1998), Lin
and Mendelzon (1999). These operators come in two types. On the one hand, there
are majority operators that minimize the level of total dissatisfaction (Konieczny
1999; Lin and Mendelzon 1996). On the other hand, there are arbitration operators,
which define rules to equally distribute the level of individual dissatisfaction among
the group members (Konieczny 1999). The model presented here will make use of a
majority operator studied by Konieczny and Pino-Pe´rez (1998, 1999, 2002a). This
merging operator identifies the collective outcome with the set of models that are
closest to the individual bases. The result is the same as the outcome we obtain by
propositionwise majority voting.11 Yet, the paradox is avoided by adding domain-
specific restrictions (integrity constraints) to the collective base. One of the key points
in the literature of knowledge fusion is that merging consistent knowledge bases does
9In belief fusion, the latter corresponds to belief bases provided with different reliability values
(see, for example, Benferhat et al. 1999; Cholvy 1994; Lin 1996; Maynard-Reid and Shoham 1998).
10For a study of expert rights in judgment aggregation see Dietrich and List 2004.
11This will be clarified in the following of the paper, see section 5.
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not guarantee a consistent collective outcome. To overcome this problem, the integrity
constraints are imposed on the final bases. This ensures that inconsistent models for
the collective are ruled out from the set of possible group decisions. Finally, unlike
the existing models for judgment aggregation, all possible consistent results for the
collective outcome are explored and a ranking of them is defined.
4 The Formal Model
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} (n ≥ 2) be a set of individuals. Let L be a finitary propositional
language, built up from a finite set P of propositional letters and the usual logical
connectives (¬, ∧, ∨,→, and↔). The belief base Ki of an agent i is a consistent and
complete12 finite set of atomic propositions like A and B, and compound propositions
like ¬A, A∧B, (A∨B)↔ C, and so on. Ki can also be represented as the conjunction
of its propositional formulas.
An interpretation is a function P → {0, 1} and it is represented as the list of the
binary evaluations. For example, given three propositional variables P , Q and R, the
vector (0,1,0) stands for the interpretation in which P and R are false and Q is true.
Let W = {0, 1}P be the set of all interpretations. An interpretation is a model of
a propositional formula if and only if it makes the formula true in the usual truth
functional way. For instance, the interpretation (1,0,0) is a model of (P ∧ Q) ↔ R,
but it is not a model of P ∧Q ∧R. Finally, the set of models of a formula is the set
of all the interpretations that make that formula true.
IC is the belief base whose elements are the integrity constraints. Given a multi-
set13 K = {K1, K2, . . . , Kn} and IC, a merging operator F is a function that assigns
a belief base to K and IC. By borrowing the term from judgment aggregation, we
call K a profile. Let FIC(K) denote the collective belief base resulting from the IC
12In the new argument-based procedure the completeness requirement can be relaxed. However,
here Ki is assumed to be complete to keep the model as close as possible to the original formulation
of the discursive dilemma.
13In a multi-set an element can appear several times. Here, it means that two (or more) individuals
can hold the same judgments on the propositions about which they have to express their view.
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merging on K. In this paper I will use the model-based merging operator introduced
by Konieczny and Pino-Pe´rez (1999).14 The idea of a model-based fusion operator
is that models of FIC(K) are models of IC, which are preferred according to some
criterion depending on K. Usually the preference information takes the form of a
total pre-order (≤) on the interpretations induced by a notion of distance d(ω,K)
between an interpretation ω and the profile K.
In a distance-based approach ≤K is defined in two steps. The first step determines
a distance between each possible interpretation (that is, those interpretations that
are models of IC) and the models of each Ki in the profile K. A distance between
interpretations is a function d :W ×W → R+ such that for all ω, ω′ ∈ W :
1. d(ω, ω′) = d(ω′, ω)
2. d(ω, ω′) = 0 iff ω = ω′.
Since a belief base can have more than one interpretation that makes it true,15
the distance between an interpretation ω and a belief base K is the minimal distance
d between ω and any model of K. Formally:
d(ω,K) = minω′|=Kd(ω, ω′)
Intuitively, the distance is a number that measures the level of dissatisfaction of
each individual in the group with respect to a possible collective outcome.
The second step is to assign a distance value to an interpretation ω and a profile
K. This is defined with the help of an aggregation function D : Rn+ → R+ as
Dd(ω,K) = D (d(ω,K1), d(ω,K2), ..., d(ω,Kn)) (Konieczny et al. 2004). Any such
aggregation function induces a total pre-order 6K on the set W with respect to the
distances to a given profile K. Thus, an IC majority merging operator F for a
14This type of operators are also discussed in (Revesz 1997; Lin and Mendelzon 1999; Liberatore
and Schaerf 2000). For syntax-based fusion operators, see Baral et al. 1992 and Konieczny 2000.
15This is true in general, but not for complete bases, like the ones we are taking into consideration
in this paper, which have a unique model.
11
profile K can be defined as FIC(K) = min([IC],6K), i.e., the set of all models of IC
(denoted by [IC]) with minimal distance Dd to the profile K. The minimal distance
identifies the final collective outcome, i.e. the belief base with the lowest total level
of dissatisfaction among all possible models satisfying IC.
The most widely used majority merging operator in the literature is the operator
∆d,Σ defined as follows:
1. d is the Hamming distance — the number of propositional letters on which two
interpretations differ, i.e., d(ω, ω′) = |{pi ∈ P|ω(pi) 6= ω′(pi)}| and
2. Dd(ω,K) =
∑
id(ω,Ki) is the sum of componentwise distances d defined before.
For example, the Hamming distance between ω = (1, 0, 0, 1) and ω′ = (0, 1, 0, 1) is
d(ω, ω′) = 2. We use the Hamming distance because it is a well known, intuitive and
easy to define distance. But the Hamming distance is only one among many possible
distance functions that we may use. In fact, as shown in (Konieczny and Pino-Pe´rez,
2002b), the logical properties of a merging operator do not depend on the chosen
distance.16 For the purpose of the present paper, it is interesting to mention that,
when there is no paradox, merging individual bases using the Hamming distance gives
the same result as propositionwise majority voting. The difference between the two
procedures is that — unlike propositionwise majority voting — the merging operator
excludes the inconsistent collective judgments (via IC), and defines a ranking on
all the allowed collective judgments. The observation that, were the inconsistent
judgments not excluded by IC, the merging operator and propositionwise majority
voting would give the same outcome, shows that the fusion method used to tackle the
discursive paradox is not an ad hoc method, but really a more fine-grained procedure
than propositionwise majority. We are now ready to apply the method of belief
merging to judgment aggregation.
16The logical properties of the merging operators are studied by Konieczny and Pino-Pe´rez in a
number of papers, for example in (1999).
12
5 The Argument-Based Procedure
The lesson of the discursive dilemma is that propositionwise majority voting may fail
to assign a consistent collective judgment to certain individual judgments. List and
Pettit (2002) have proven a general impossibility theorem to show that the occur-
rence of an inconsistency does not depend on a specific aggregation procedure. Their
impossibility result holds for all aggregation functions that satisfy some minimal con-
ditions, such as universal domain, anonymity and systematicity. Universal domain
states that any logically possible individual judgment is accepted as an input by the
aggregation procedure. Moreover, anonymity ensures that all the voters are equally
treated. Systematicity is the condition requiring that “the collective judgment on
each proposition should depend exclusively on the pattern of individual judgments
on that proposition. In particular, the collective judgment on no propositions should
be given special weight in determining the collective judgments on others” (List and
Pettit 2002, p.98). List and Pettit recognize that the condition of systematicity is
controversial and that, when coupled with anonymity, it implies that if two proposi-
tions receive the same degree of support (not necessarily from the same individuals)
the collective view on the two propositions should be the same.17 As in the career
development fellowship example, where a majority of the members in the committee
supports P and another majority supports Q, systematicity requires that the collec-
tive outcome endorses P ∧Q in contradiction to the majority voting on the conclusion
against R.
Systematicity is relaxed in the argument-based procedure that I propose here. As
the next example will make clear, the argument-based procedure gives priority to
the integrity constraints in IC over the other propositions. The view of the group
is selected from the models of IC according to a distance measure that takes into
account each Ki. A set of possible interpretations is assigned to each belief base.
Suppose that Ki = {(A∨B)∧C}. The set ω of interpretations for Ki is Mod(Ki) =
17For a critique on systematicity see Chapman 2002.
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{(1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1)}. If, for instance, an integrity constraint requires A to be
true, the model (0,1,1) will not be considered as a possible outcome.
In the fellowship example all three members consistently make their judgments
on the propositions P , Q and R given the decision rule (P ∧ Q) ↔ R. Therefore
K = {K1, K2, K3} and IC = {(P ∧Q)↔ R}. We can then write:
K1 = {A,B,C}
K2 = {A,¬B,¬C}
K3 = {¬A,B,¬C}
The models for each belief base are the following:
Mod(K1) = {(1, 1, 1)}
Mod(K2) = {(1, 0, 0)}
Mod(K3) = {(0, 1, 0)}
The table below shows the result of the IC majority fusion operator on K =
{K1, K2, K3}. In the first column are all the possible interpretations for the proposi-
tional variables P , Q and R. The rows with a shaded background correspond to the
interpretations excluded by IC. The numbers in the columns of K1, K2 and K3 are
the Hamming distances of each Ki from the correspondent interpretation. Finally, in
the last column is Σid(ω,Ki).
14
K1 K2 K3 Σid(ω,Ki)
(1,1,1) 0 2 2 4
(1,1,0) 1 1 1 3
(1,0,1) 1 3 1 5
(1,0,0) 2 2 0 4
(0,1,1) 1 1 3 5
(0,1,0) 2 0 2 4
(0,0,1) 2 2 2 6
(0,0,0) 3 1 1 5
Because ∆d,ΣIC (K) is an IC merging operator, the collective outcomes are chosen
among the interpretations that are models of IC. Only (1, 1, 1), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0) and
(0, 0, 0) are the available candidates for the collective judgments. Moreover, ∆d,ΣIC (K)
selects the interpretations associated with the minimum distance value.18 Thus, no
paradox arises using the fusion operator: Mod(∆d,ΣIC (K)) = {(1, 1, 1), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0)}.
These are the models of the disjunction K1 ∨K2 ∨K3. This result can be interpreted
as a tie between belief bases. In this case, the paradox is avoided at the price of
indecision.
The tie means that there is not enough information for the collectivity to choose
a unique truth-assignment to P , Q and R. Yet, there are situations in which, despite
of the lack of information, the group needs to opt for one of the elements in the
tie. Social choice theory, for example, appeals to tie-breaking rules. These are,
by definition, arbitrary. However, randomly choosing one of the belief bases in a
judgment aggregation context appears difficult to justify. Instead, in cases like our
fellowship example, some conditions can be relaxed, namely the assumptions that each
voter and each alternatives are equally treated. For instance, degrees of expertise can
18Minimizing the total distance is a way to capture the intuition that in a majority merging
operator the collective outcome endorses a set of opinions if this is supported by a large part of the
group.
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be assessed for every individual in the group with respect to the propositions under
judgment. It is finally worth noticing that an aggregation procedure on n bases Ki
that would always identify the social outcome with the disjunction K1∨K2∨ . . .∨Kn
would admittedly not be satisfactory. But, as the next example will show, this is not
the case in the merging approach that we are considering here.
Before moving to the next example, where the merging operator picks one of the
Kis as the group outcome, there are three points that we should note. The first is that
had it not been discarded by IC, ∆d,ΣIC (K) would have selected (1, 1, 0) as the model
for the collective outcome. This is precisely the result associated with the discursive
paradox. The fact that, in the case of aggregation of binary evaluations, the majority
voting minimizes the sum of Hamming distances, has already been noticed elsewhere
(see Brams et al. 2004, Proposition 4). Unfortunately, it may happen that the closest
model violates the integrity constraints (this is when the discursive dilemma arises).
This, however, is not a danger with ∆d,ΣIC (K) because the inconsistent options are
rejected by IC. The second point is that while majority rule on propositions can find
only one model, the fusion operator looks at all possible outcomes and orders them
according to some criteria (for the majority merging operator the criterion is the min-
imal distance). This is important especially in those cases where the fusion operator
is used to aggregate several bases, since it guarantees that no relevant information
is discarded. Third, note that normally a fusion operator does not require the belief
bases to satisfy IC. Here I assume that each Ki satisfies IC for ease of comparison
with the classical discursive paradox. When this assumption is relaxed, the interpre-
tations of the belief bases that violate the integrity constraints are ruled out by the
IC imposed on the final outcome. The collectivity is ensured to be rational, despite
the fact that some of its members (or all) made irrational judgments.
Let us now show that not only does the merging approach avoid the inconsistent
results of the propositionwise majority voting, but it is also not sensitive to the
instability problem. As we have seen, the premise-based procedure may lead to
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contradictory results. In section 2, the example of a group of people expressing
their judgments on the propositions A, B and C consistently with the rule ((A ∧
B) ∨ (¬A ∧ ¬B)) ↔ C illustrated that different outcomes can be obtained by the
premise-based procedure, depending on whether the majority is calculated on the
atomic propositions A, B, or on the disjuncts A ∧ B and ¬A ∧ ¬B. Transforming
the judgments of the example in section 2 into interpretations for each belief base,
we obtain:
Mod(K1) =Mod(K2) =Mod(K3) = {(1, 1, 1)}
Mod(K4) =Mod(K5) = {(1, 0, 0)}
Mod(K6) =Mod(K7) = {(0, 1, 0)}
The table below displays the results of IC majority fusion operator on K =
{K1, K2, . . . K7}. Interpretations that violate IC do not appear.
K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 K7 Σid(ω,Ki)
(1,1,1) 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 8
(1,0,0) 2 2 2 0 0 2 2 10
(0,1,0) 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 10
(0,0,1) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 14
The shaded row is the unique model of ((A∧B)∨ (¬A∧B))↔ C selected as the
group outcome. Because ∆d,ΣIC (K) is a model-based operator, it is not sensitive to the
instability problem that affects the premise-based procedure. However, this example
also shows that the argument-based procedure always prevents an inconsistent out-
come to be chosen as the group’s decision and, in some cases, also selects a unique
judgment as the social result.
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6 Conclusion
Two lessons can be drawn from the discursive paradox. The first one is that the
set of propositions on which most group members agree is not guaranteed to be a
candidate for the collective decision because the set can fail to satisfy consistency
even though each individual consistently expressed her judgments. The second lesson
is that, when this happens, we need to look for the second (or third...) best outcome.
Complex collective decisions are therefore paradox-free when the logical relations
between propositions are treated as integrity constraints on the collective judgment.
The premise-based procedure and the conclusion-based procedure have been pre-
sented in the literature on judgment aggregation as the escape-routes from the discur-
sive dilemma. In section 2, I criticized both these procedures and urged an approach
that reconciles the premises and the conclusion as part of the same argument.
The approach introduced in this paper profits from the work done on belief merg-
ing in artificial intelligence. I have claimed that judgment aggregation and belief
fusion are similar processes and that a collaboration between these two areas is defi-
nitely fruitful. A majority IC merging operator for belief bases has been introduced.
The integrity constraints ensure that the merging operator looks for solutions only
among the consistent models. Each belief base is confronted with a group decision
candidate, and a number is assigned as a result of the comparison. Intuitively, this
number captures how much the two bases disagree with each other. Finally, the fusion
function selects the model (or the models) that keeps the disagreement of most belief
bases at the lowest level.
The value of the argument-based procedure rests upon the exclusion of inconsistent
sets of judgments from the set of the candidates apt to become collective judgments,
and the definition of a ranking on the remaining candidates.
From these results, implications obtain for all those groups of people — like expert
panels, boards, councils, societies, etc. — that have to make decisions on the basis
of logically connected propositions, and moreover, want or need to be able to justify
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their decisions. In order to define a more realistic model of group decision-making,
I plan to investigate extensions of the argument-based procedure. For example, as
I already mentioned, belief merging allows us to relax the completeness requirement
of the belief bases, on the ground that we want to conceive of the possibility of an
individual to be indifferent (with respect to a preference) or ignorant (of a certain
matter). Let us suppose that we have a finite number of belief bases expressing the
decisions of some individuals about three propositions A, B and C. Ki = {A,B} is
a belief base even if it is not complete. The agent is indifferent to, or unable to make
a decision on, C. Therefore Ki is satisfied by {(1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 0)}.
Also, an IC fusion operator can assign an outcome to belief bases that violate IC.
Clearly, the models for the bases that violate IC will not be taken into consideration
as candidates for the final decision. But this is an important feature because it gives
us the possibility to merge bases even if some of them (or all) do not conform to IC.
For instance, an individual who does not obey IC has no chance that her own view
will be adopted by the group.
Majority fusion operators are not the only operators that can be introduced to
merge individuals’ judgments where each member has equal power to influence the
final decision. An alternative fusion aggregation is the arbitration. The best outcome
for an arbitration operation is a belief base that aims at equally distributing the level
of dissatisfaction among the individuals. In some cases this allows us to distinguish
between two incomparable judgments (see also Konieczny and Pino-Pe´rez 2002b).
For instance, a majority merging operator over K = {K1, K2, K3} finds that two
models have Σid(ω,Ki) equal to 6. Still, the arbitration operator will prefer the one
that equally distributes the dissatisfaction among members (like (2,2,2) to (5,1,0)). A
question open to investigation is whether an arbitration operator can be used in any
kind of judgment aggregation process. Is the arbitration operator likely to capture
only the aggregation of individual desires or can it also be used for the aggregation
of beliefs?
19
Finally, it would be interesting to study the aggregation judgment where the
individuals do not all have the same power to influence the final decision, following
the work done by Dietrich and List (2004). Setting different levels of expertise over
the individuals could be especially useful in those scenarios in which a tie between
belief bases is obtained as the social outcome, nevertheless a decision must be made,
without invoking an arbitrary tie-breaking rule.
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